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LARRY E. RIBSTEIN*
The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN ENRON, WORLDCOM, AND other cases have fo-
cused attention on the appropriate scope of criminal liability for business conduct.
In many of these cases, the defendants were not thieves, at least not in the conven-
tional sense, nor did they use the corporate form to endanger the public. Their
crimes consisted of engaging in transactions or making statements that obscured
the financial health of their firms, hurting mostly people who traded in the firms'
shares. In some cases, particularly Enron, the conduct involved complex transac-
tions that differed only marginally from what was generally considered at the time
legal business behavior. Moreover, the defendants, not intending to destroy their
firms in the least, desperately attempted to keep them afloat. The defendants may
not have been heroes, but should they be considered criminals?
While these prosecutions unfolded, I commented on them in a series of posts on
my weblog, Ideoblog, and as a guest on the Enron Forum held on The Conglomer-
ate. These posts cover the same ground as my comments on October 13, 2006, at
the University of Maryland School of Law's Roundtable on the Criminalization of
Corporate Law but in somewhat greater depth. Accordingly, I have used these posts
as the basis of the following discussion. This account preserves the contemporane-
ous flavor of the initial discussion, and accordingly has not been updated to reflect
the many developments during its publication process.
I. DEFINING CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR'
Depriving people of their liberty is the most serious thing our government can do,
short of killing them. It is justified if we are very sure that the conduct deserves
society's sevierest condemnation. If we are not certain, however, we risk diluting
the moral force of the criminal law and instilling doubts concerning the system's
fairness. Just as we do not tolerate reasonable doubt when convicting a particular
defendant of the crime charged, similarly we make sure that the conduct the defen-
dant has been charged with is in fact criminal.
One of the problems with criminalizing agency costs is that agents are almost
always a little bit unfaithful. While Justice Cardozo said that "[n]ot honesty alone,
Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair at University of Illinois College of Law.
1. This section is adapted from the posting of Larry E. Ribstein to The Conglomerate, http://www.
theconglomerate.org/2006/06 /the troublewit.html (June 1, 2006).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
THE PERILS OF CRIMINALIZING AGENCY COSTS
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior,"2
we do not actually expect such a high standard of conduct. Firms might prefer a
slightly unfaithful genius to a slavishly faithful fool. We do not want to spend $100
to catch $10 worth of cheating. This raises questions about when does an agent's
unfaithfulness deserve some type of a sanction, and specifically, when does such
conduct cross the line to criminal.
Disciplining agents also requires pinning responsibility for corporate failure on
particular people within the organization. If someone should be criminally respon-
sible for obscuring Enron's financial condition, who should it be? Should it be the
midlevel executives who designed the misleading structures, the executive officers
who signed-off on them, the independent directors who failed to object, the law-
yers, accountants, banks, and other executives who enabled them, anybody who
knew about them and did not speak up, the whistleblower who only told those
within the organization, or all of the above?
Criminal law is not particularly well suited to make the sort of fine distinctions
these cases require. Letting some of these people off while others spend their lives
in jail creates a wide perception of injustice and sending all of them to jail dissi-
pates the moral force of the criminal law. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, giving
prosecutors such broad discretion as to which agents to charge creates opportuni-
ties for prosecutorial misconduct, the effects of which may be even worse than
anything the corporate agents did. As discussed in Part IV, this line drawing puts
heavy demands on fact finders who are unschooled in business.
II. DETERRENCE3
Some say we need corporate criminal liability because it is the only sanction that
can keep the Ken Lays and Jeff Skillings of the world honest. But there are serious
questions whether the deterrent force of the criminal law is effective or desirable in
this setting.
To begin with, we have to ask why somebody like Jeff Skilling would not only
risk jail-time, but also enormous civil liability,4 as well as loss of a prestigious job, a
livelihood, and hard-earned reputation, just to lie to the shareholders. Of course,
2. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
3. This section is adapted from the posting of Larry E. Ribstein to The Conglomerate, http://www.
theconglomerate.org/2006/06/deterrence.html (June 1, 2006).
4. To be sure, civil liability is rarely imposed on corporate officers and directors. See generally Bernard
Black, Brian Cheffins, & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (discussing
the out-of-pocket liability risks facing outside directors and concluding that liability is rarely imposed). Most
liability in corporate fraud cases is, oddly enough, assessed against the corporation itself, and therefore largely
on innocent shareholders who may already have been hurt by the fraud. See Richard A. Booth, Who Should
Recover What in a Securities Fraud Class Action? (Univ. of Md. Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 2005-
32, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197. The entire structure of liability and settlement some-
times seems to conspire to take the brunt of liability off the insiders and place it on the insurers and the
corporation they defrauded. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter-
rence and Its Implementation (Columbia Law Sch. Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 293,
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Skilling had a job and a livelihood to protect, but surely someone who has spent a
lifetime taking calculated risks would understand that the truth will eventually
come out, and that jail-time and disgrace are much worse than plummeting stock
prices. Perhaps Skilling had no reason to believe jail was a possibility, in which case
we risk unfairness to Skilling in order to teach a lesson to those who come later.
But the fact that, even apart from jail, Skilling was willing to take such a desperate
chance demonstrates something about the deterrent effect of criminal penalties in
this setting.
As I have discussed previously,5 the reason why individuals like Skilling take such
big risks is that they are overconfident in their judgment and ability to control
future events. In fact, it has been argued that the most self-confident executives
have the best chance of making it to the top of high-flying firms like Enron.6 These
people might think that everything is going well in the face of evidence that would
trouble more reasonable people. By the time they see that they have stretched the
truth, it may be too late to avoid losing their jobs, reputations, and, perhaps, free-
dom. They then may not only have a strong self-preservation incentive to lie but
may justify continued lies by reasoning that the shareholders are being misled by
the market's fleeting judgments. To counteract this apparent phenomenon, they
participate in a cover-up even when it has only a small tendency to succeed in the
long run.
Even if we could increase criminal liability enough to achieve significant margi-
nal deterrence for the most aggressively over-confident managers, it still may be a
bad idea because of the risk of deterring beneficial corporate conduct. Cautious
managers will want to stay very far away from conduct that has even the slightest
chance of landing them in jail. As a result, they may avoid even productive transac-
tions that could attract adverse public attention, particularly if one effect of that
attention might be a criminal prosecution.
All of this is not to say that corporate criminals should escape punishment be-
cause they are not easily deterred-an argument that could apply to sociopaths-
but that deterrence is not an especially good justification for punishment that is
not warranted on other grounds.
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893833. If we want to ensure deterrence, this system, and not the
criminal justice system, is the place to start.
5. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 28 j. CORP. L. 1, 19-22 (2002).
6. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsi-
bility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 968, 969-71 (2002).
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III. PROSECUTORS' AGENCY COSTS
7
With all of the talk about evil corporate agents, we tend to forget about the govern-
ment agents who try the cases and decide what cases to try. For many of these
lawyers, Enron is not a disaster, but a launching pad into a lucrative big firm prac-
tice or a political career.' Prosecutors have little incentive to abort the launch by
deciding not-to prosecute. Although we want these agents to be motivated to win,
we also want them to play by the rules, particularly because their mistakes have
more serious consequences than dented portfolios.
The risks inherent in prosecutorial incentives are compounded by the fact that
what makes criminalizing agency costs problematic for the criminal justice system
also makes corporate crime challenging for prosecutors. Prosecutors have to get the
jurors to see the criminal conduct buried in the accounting and distinct from the
run-of-the-mill unfaithfulness of their colleagues.
Prosecutors would naturally like some shortcuts to make their jobs easier. For
example, prosecutors would like to be able to choose who says what at trial. They
can motivate helpful witnesses by threatening them with hard time, because even a
day in jail is a big deal for such people as they get scared easily. Prosecutors also
need to keep those witnesses who are friendly to the defense from testifying. It
helps to let defense-friendly witnesses know that they are potential defendants,
without immunity from prosecution if they testify. In the Enron debacle, for exam-
ple, there are approximately one hundred unindicted co-conspirators, including Jeff
McMahon, former Enron treasurer, Greg Whalley, former Enron president, and
David Duncan, former top Enron auditor at Arthur Andersen whose guilty plea
was vacated after the Supreme Court reversed the Andersen conviction.9 These peo-
ple might have had some very interesting things to say about what they did or did
not tell Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling about what was happening at Enron.
Prosecutors can also get the company to cooperate by hinting that it might go
the Arthur Andersen way if it does not cooperate, including having to pay employ-
ees' defense costs. In the "Thompson Memorandum," Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson ordered federal prosecutors to consider, when deciding whether
to indict a business entity, the extent of the entity's cooperation in the investiga-
tion, including whether the defendant had advanced legal fees to employees, unless
advancement was required by governing law.'0 The line between permissible lever-
age and questionable extortion in the government's conduct may be no brighter
than the one between crime and ordinary business practices in the conduct the
government is prosecuting.
7. This section is adapted from the posting of Larry E. Ribstein to The Conglomerate, http://www.
theconglomerate.org/2006/06/prosecutors.html (June 1, 2006).
8. See Carrie Johnson, After Enron, Fighting Off the Job Offers, WASH. PosT, June 5, 2006, at D2.
9. John R. Emshwiller, Will Enron Probe Spawn Further Criminal Cases?, WALL. ST. J., June 6, 2006, at Cl.
10. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Dep't Components,
U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003).
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IV. PASSING JUDGMENT"
As discussed in Part I, applying criminal law to agency costs requires the type of
judgment that the criminal justice system is not well-designed to make. This is
especially evident when one considers the difficulties involved in courts drawing
these lines in actual cases.
For many judges and jurors, what goes on in an executive suite may just as well
be happening on Mars. When people have to make judgments that transcend their
experience and knowledge, they might engage in heuristic shortcuts. They might be
influenced by, for example, resentment of the rich and powerful. Also, most people
get their information about corporate executives from newspapers,' 2 films,'3 and
other media sources, which portray corporate executives as selfish, greedy, and irre-
sponsible. In this environment, when the Enron jurors had to adjudicate responsi-
bility for Enron's collapse and had before them two of the company's most
prominent villains, there is little doubt about the inferences that the jurors had
drawn.
This is not to say that executives should be able to avoid trial just because judges
and jurors might get it wrong-that is a risk in every trial. But it does mean that,
even if it is theoretically possible to distinguish criminal and non-criminal behavior
in the agency-costs context, we need to be realistic about judges' and jurors' ability
to make these distinctions and take into account the costs of potential error.
The problems of passing criminal judgment on the conduct of corporate agents
crystallized in the wake of the guilty verdicts and Ken Lay's death following his
conviction in the Enron trial. Nancy Rapoport, former Dean of the Houston Uni-
versity Law Center, reports she
was walking around downtown Houston yesterday and passed by a conve-
nience store .... On the wall nearest the store's door was the classic Houston
Chronicle (collector's edition) headline, 'Guilty! Guilty!' It struck me that, if a
downtown convenience store has that headline up on the wall after last week,
then it's clear that Houston's still angry about the whole Enron mess. And that
anger isn't just from employees and shareholders-it's from the hundreds of
small businesses, like this store, that lost serious income from Enron's collapse.'4
11. This section is adapted from the posting of Larry E. Ribstein to The Conglomerate, http://www.
theconglomerate.org/2006/06/judgesand_juri.html (June 1, 2006).
12. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Public Face of Scholarship, 85 WASH. U L.Q. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=897590 (discussing journalists' biases and coverage of business).
13. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Wall Street & Vine: Hollywood's View of Business (Univ. of Ill. Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE05-010, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=563181
(discussing anti-capitalist bias in film).
14. See posting of Nancy Rapoport to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/06/
scenes-fromdow.html (June 1, 2006).
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This has all happened before.'" For example, following the bursting of the South
Sea Bubble three hundred years ago:
Nobody blamed the credulity and avarice of the people-the degrading lust of
gain, which had swallowed up every nobler quality in the national character,
or the infatuation which had made the multitude run their heads with such
frantic eagerness into the net held out for them by scheming projectors. These
things were never mentioned. The people were a simple, honest, hard-working
people, ruined by a gang of robbers, who were to be hanged, drawn, and quar-
tered without mercy. This was almost the unanimous feeling of the country.6
Far from being a time of sober reflection, Ken Lay's post-conviction death trig-
gered a wave of vituperation. Washington Post columnist Henry Allen expressed
disappointment that Lay's victims would not have the satisfaction of hearing about
Ken Lay being raped by his cellmate.' When I criticized Lay's likely life sentence for
his crimes, commentators responded with statements like "I hope Lay is burning in
hell,""8 "Lay certainly did do more harm than a murderer,"' 9 and "Lay certainly
caused billions of dollars of people's pensions to disappear."2 Yet as discussed in
Part V, this animosity toward Lay was entirely out of proportion to what Lay actu-
ally did and the damage he caused.
V. PERCEPTION VS. REALITY
The people who reacted so violently to the guilty verdicts and Lay's death were
oblivious to what Lay was actually convicted of-not for setting up a big Ponzi
scheme, but for lying about it at the tail end. Some people bought Enron at that
point because they did not know the truth, which may have been partly Lay's fault.
But every share of stock that was bought was also sold (though most of Lay's wealth
was still in Enron at the end). A lot of people were hurt by hanging on to their
15. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2003) (explaining the "centuries-old
cycle of capital market booms followed by busts and regulation").
16. CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS, 72-73 (L.C.
Page & Co. 1932) (1852).
17. Henry Allen, Ken Lay's Last Evasion, WASH. POST, July 6, 2006, at Cl (stating that "none of [Lay's]
victims will be able to contemplate that ... he might be spending long nights locked in a cell with a panting
tattooed monster named Sumo, a man of strange and constant demands").
18. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/what did.
lay-do.html#comment-1936805 (July 5, 2006, 23:18 EST) (quoting a comment to Professor Ribstein's original
posting).
19. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/what did_
lay-do.html#comment-19384596 (July 6, 2006, 14:00 EST) (quoting a comment to Professor Ribstein's original
posting).
20. Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/what-did
lay-do.html#comment-19388018 (July 6, 2006, 17:33 EST) (quoting a comment to Professor Ribstein's original
posting).
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stock too long, but they were not hurt by Lay. If he had told the truth at his first
opportunity, or even just remained conspicuously quiet, they just would have got-
ten hurt sooner.2'
The difference between the reality and perception of Lay's conduct is exemplified
in a New York Times article printed immediately after Lay's conviction that dis-
cussed the twists and turns in Lay's prosecution. 2 Although the reporters spin the
story as a drama in which heroic government lawyers dramatically pull off a win
against all odds, an alternative narrative emerges about a prosecution team out to
get Lay at all costs because he had already been convicted in the court of public
opinion." As the reporters note, "[t]he public widely perceived the criminal case
against Mr. Lay to have been a 'can't lose' proposition."24 The prosecution's task
was to serve up something that matched that perception. At stake were some prom-
ising careers on the other side of the revolving door."
The Enron task force first focused on the Enron partnerships, including LJM. 6
But as Leslie Caldwell, initial task force head, said "We realized very fully early on
that Lay was not involved in the decision-making day to day and that we weren't
going to be able to prove his involvement in the structuring of transactions like
LJM.
27
The task force next tried to prove that Lay engaged in insider trading when he
sold Enron shares back to the company. But the reporters note that "[t] here was no
clear evidence that Mr. Lay had actively tried to deceive Enron's board, and he
could contend that he had relied on Enron lawyers to approve all of his trades."28
Moreover, prosecutor Sam Buell stated that "[tihe insider-trading characterization
of these sales just never seemed sustainable, except on some very broad theory that,
when you know things at a company aren't going well, you can't sell."29 In other
words, Lay did not possess material non-public information.
Still undaunted, the team thought they might try Lay for looting Enron by pull-
ing $100 million out of the company as it deteriorated. The reporters said
21. See posting of Larry E. Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/
what did_laydo.html (July 5, 2006, 18:44 EST). Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts recently expressed skepticism
about allowing even civil recovery for this sort of injury. He remarked at oral argument in Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner 6 Smith, Inc. v. Dabit that "what [plaintiffs] want to do is cash in on the fraud .... [T]heir claim is that
they didn't get to sell the stock at an inflated price to somebody who didn't know about the fraud. That's the
damages that they want to collect. And that seems to be an odd claim to recognize." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 29, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (No. 04-1371).
22. See Alexei Barrionuevo & Kurt Eichenwald, The Enron Case that Almost Wasn't, N.Y.TIMES, June 4,
2006, § 3, at 1.
23. Posting of Larry E. Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/06/
twonarratives_.html (June 4, 2006, 11:23 EST) (discussing and analyzing the New York Times story).
24. Barrionuevo & Eichenwald, supra note 22.
25. See Johnson, supra note 8, at D2.




VOL. 2 NO. 1 2007
THE PERILS OF CRIMINALIZING AGENCY COSTS
"[p]rosecutors were cagey, never signaling to Mr. Lay's defense team that they had
abandoned the insider-trading theory and replaced it with a new allegation."3 As
noted above, however, Lay had the company's approval. This is the part that is so
tricky about criminalizing agency costs. Unlike a robbery, the agent often has the
principal's explicit or implicit consent for the relevant conduct. It is possible to
second-guess the corporate approval process, but these subtle distinctions are not
an appropriate basis for criminal prosecution.
The prosecutors still were not ready to give up. They tried to show that Lay
attempted to get the Bush administration to help the company as it was collapsing
in 2001-a story that was floating around at the time. Unfortunately for this the-
ory, Alan Greenspan, Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans, and Treasury Secretary
Paul H. O'Neill all reported telephone calls from Lay, but could provide no evi-
dence of wrongdoing.
Then in spring 2003, the prosecutors finally found the magic key-they would
show that Enron was weaker than what Lay's public statements portrayed. It is not
surprising that the prosecutors only came across this theory after rejecting so many
others. After all, at the time of making the statements, Lay had only recently come
back on board. He must have thought at the time that the company was still via-
ble. This would leave only a narrow window at the tail end of the drama when it
was credible that Lay's statements did not reflect his sincere belief.
The reporters note, however, that the prosecutors had help in proving fraud-
grand jury statements by former Enron treasurer and convicted felon Ben Glisan
that Lay was lying when he made upbeat statements about Enron in 2001.3" The
reporters do not mention the rest of Glisan's story.32 Glisan decided to go to jail
right away in exchange for a deal that he hoped would send him to Club Fed. The
government instead sent him to solitary confinement in a harsher facility, evidently
hoping to soften him up for more cooperation in netting the big Enron fish. Glisan
was, indeed, negotiating for a shorter prison term and better conditions. Although
Glisan was initially sentenced to five years beginning in 2003, following his testi-
mony against Lay, he was released to home confinement in September 2006, and
from custody entirely in January 2007."3
Once the prosecution team finally had a theory, it brought extra firepower on
board to nail it down, including prosecutors Sean Berkowitz and John Hueston.
Hueston came up with the theory of Lay's use of bank loans to buy stocks on
margin-a breach of contract with the banks that also happens to be a criminal
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Posting of Tom Kirkendall to Houston's Clear Thinkers, http://blog.kir.com/archives/003178.asp
(June 2, 2006, 5:21 EST).
33. Posting of Larry E. Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/06/
twonarratives_ .html (June 4, 2006, 11:23 EST).
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violation of federal banking law. Hueston then built the case that Lay was lying
about Enron's financial condition. 4
The troubling story that emerges from these facts is that the prosecutors were
determined to get Lay, who had already been convicted by public opinion for being
associated so closely with Enron. The prosecutors looked long and hard and finally
found Ben Glisan, whom the jury was willing to believe despite his questionable
provenance. There were other potential witnesses with other potential stories, but
the government was willing neither to free them from the threat of indictment nor
grant them immunity. The prosecutors' search for some wrongdoing and the string
of false starts are starkly inconsistent with the public's view that the evil Enron
defendants, and Lay in particular, were so clearly responsible for ruining millions
of people and deserved the harshest punishment.
VI. THE DENOUEMENT: THE KPMG DECISION
Even if public opinion still favors corporate criminal prosecutions such as Enron,
the courts may have the last word on excesses in prosecuting corporate crime. On
June 26, 2006, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the federal district court in New York sternly
rebuked the government lawyers prosecuting the mammoth tax shelter case against
KPMG.3 ' The opinion established an important principle for future cases-that
criminal law must respect the importance of the complex sets of contracts and
incentive devices that make firms work.36
In the KPMG case, the government indicted sixteen people who worked for
KPMG defendants and a couple of others for allegedly conspiring to make and sell
bogus tax shelters. Prodded by prosecutors, KPMG cut off advancement of these
defendants' legal fees. Judge Kaplan held a hearing on the KPMG defendants' claim
that the government pressure on KPMG was improper.
Judge Kaplan ruled that the government's conduct violated the defendants' Fifth
Amendment right to a fair trial and Sixth Amendment right to counsel.37 Although
the government insisted that KPMG made its own decision on advancement of
expenses,38 this claim undermined clear government policy to prevent advancement
expressed in the Thompson Memorandum.39 The court held that "KPMG's decision
to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who was indicted and
to limit and condition such payments prior to indictment upon cooperation with
the government was the direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thomp-
34. See Barrionuevo & Eichenwald, supra note 22.
35. See United States. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
36. Id.; see Posting of Larry E. Ribstein to Tech Central Station Daily, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?
id=070606E (July 6, 2006) (discussing Stein).
37. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356-73.
38. Id. at 351.
39. Id. at 368-69.
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son Memorandum and the USAO."4 Judge Kaplan accordingly rebuked the gov-
ernment for letting "its zeal get in the way of its judgment. It has violated the
Constitution it is sworn to defend."'" The court concluded that the government's
conduct was not justified by its law enforcement interests or by the fact that ad-
vancement might indicate obstruction or lack of full cooperation, noting the ex-
traordinary burden that it would place on individual defendants in mammoth cases
like this if they are unable to get their firms to advance expenses.42
The most interesting aspect of the KPMG opinion concerned the intersection of
contract rights and criminal law. The court noted that the defendants had an ex-
pectation of advancement based on KPMG's past practices, which "arguably" gave
rise to an implied contract. 3 The court said that "[t]he law protects such interests
against unjustified and improper interference. Thus, both the expectation and any
benefits that would have flowed from that expectation-the legal fees at issue
now-were, in every material sense, their property, not that of a third party."44 The
court accordingly used its "ancillary jurisdiction" to order KPMG to advance de-
fendants' fees.4"
It is important to emphasize that this is not a mere dispute about the contractual
right to indemnification. The defendants needed constitutional rights because their
contract rights could not stand up to the government's intimidation. Judge Kaplan
emphasized on the first page of his opinion that advancement and reimbursement
of legal expenses are among "three principles of American law" that are at issue in
the case,46 noting one court's statement that advancement is "an especially impor-
tant corollary to indemnification as an inducement for attracting capable individu-
als into corporate service."47
The court's holding will not solve all of the problems of corporate criminal lia-
bility. The government still retains significant power to coerce cooperation from
defendants. Moreover, the tax shelters in the case pose a particularly complex prob-
lem of drawing the line between criminal behavior and simply aggressive and ulti-
mately unsuccessful tax planning that is similar to what tax advisers do everyday.
Even if the firm's conduct might be characterized as criminal, it is still necessary to
apportion responsibility within the firm among those who designed the tax shel-
ters, gave advice to clients, and spoke to the IRS. Nevertheless, Judge Kaplan's opin-
40. Id. at 353.
41. Id. at 336.
42. Id. at 371, 378.
43. Id. at 356 n.119.
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id. at 378. The court held that, because KPMG was not a party to the case, the defendants would have
to sue KPMG for the fees, and would get an expedited hearing. Id. at 379. The defendants have done so. See
Complaint for Advancement, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 1:06-cv-5007-
LAK), 2006 WL 2922089.
46. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
47. Id.
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ion is important because it recognizes that even the criminal justice system must
recognize the parties' contract and property rights and business realities.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent criminal prosecutions in the wake of Enron and other corporate col-
lapses pose significant problems for our criminal justice system. Wrongdoing in
these cases is subtle, blame difficult to apportion, and the facts hard to find. This
puts the same type of pressure on prosecutors as on corporate agents to bend the
rules and risks imposing convictions based on misconceptions about business in-
stilled by the media. It is time for a reexamination of whether the benefits of
criminalizing agency costs are worth the costs.
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